Posted: 17.05.2023 09:23:00

Defence in word and deed

The growth of information confrontation between the world’s leading centres of power, the preparation and conduct by foreign states of the struggle in the information space: what else can threaten national security in the information aspect

The President of Belarus, Aleksandr Lukashenko,
“You know very well that the challenges that we are facing today are not a new story. We have been building our state for almost a third of a century, and we have constantly been subjected to ideological, informational, military and psychological threats. We are actually under this pressure from the collective West - Washington and its allies. The intentions are known: to destabilise society, change the constitutional order, bring the right people to power, obedient to the West. The level of technology used to achieve these goals is very high.”
During a session on the information policy on May 31st, 2022

The world today is connected to and dependent on technology more than ever before. In 2021, there were more than 10 billion active devices connected to the Internet, and in 2030 this number will exceed 25.4 billion. In the current realities, not a single state can do without a comprehensive system for protecting its information security. The information aspect is becoming an arena of interstate confrontation. As a result of cultural and ideological expansion, mainly focused on consumption, historical truth is purposefully distorted, history is falsified, the cultural heritage of mankind, the traditional spiritual and moral values of peoples, their national identity, the institution of the family and the space of intercultural interaction are being destroyed. Electronic media have a comprehensive impact on socio-political and socio-economic processes, are used to provoke internal conflicts and the destruction of states. The draft National Security Concept of Belarus states that the information security aspect implies the state of security of the information space, information infrastructure and information resources from external and internal threats in the information aspect. From what and how will we protect ourselves?




The main national interests in the information aspect are:
• implementation of the constitutional rights of citizens to receive, store and disseminate complete, reliable and timely information;
• preservation of national identity and memory of the heroic past of the Belarusian people;
• further development of a secure information environment and the information society;
• protection of society from destructive information impact;
• transformation of the information industry into an export-oriented sector of the economy;
• effective information support and support of state policy;
• reliable and sustainable functioning of national information systems and infrastructure, resources of subjects of information relations;
• development of international information co-operation based on the national interests of the Republic of Belarus;
• ensuring the safety of state secrets and other information, the distribution and (or) presentation of which is limited.

Internal sources of threats to national security in the information aspect are:
• dissemination of unreliable or deliberately distorted information capable of harming the national interests of the Republic of Belarus;
• the dependence of the Republic of Belarus on the import of information technologies, means of informatisation and information protection, their uncontrolled use in systems, the failure or destruction of which may harm national security;
• discrepancy between the quality of national content and the world level;
• active use of information and communication technologies to commit offenses;
• expanding opportunities for misconduct in relation to personal data;
• insufficient efficiency of information support of the state policy;
• low level of legal awareness and safe behaviour of users of information and communication technologies;
• Violation of the established procedure for handling state secrets.

External sources of threats to national security in the information aspect are:
• dominance of leading foreign states in the global information space, monopolisation of key segments of information markets by foreign information structures;
• purposeful activities of foreign states, international and other organisations, individuals that harm the national interests of the Republic of Belarus in the information aspect, primarily in the formation of a negative image of the state in the world;
• the growth of information confrontation between the world’s leading centres of power, the preparation and conduct by foreign states of the struggle in the information space;
• preventing the distribution of national content of the Republic of Belarus abroad;
• wide dissemination in the world information space of samples of mass culture that are contrary to universal and national spiritual and moral values;
• the imperfection of the mechanisms of international co-operation in combating crime using information and communication technologies.

RELEVANT OPINION
Sergei Klishevich, a member of the House of Representatives, “In modern conditions, not a single war can do without information and psychological support. Before subjecting a country or certain territories to aggression, the population of these territories is subjected to massive information and psychological attack in order to intimidate society and mobilise Judas to assist the aggressor. In addition, the population of the aggressor’s country itself is subjected to attacks by information and psychological weapons in order to obtain public approval of the actions taken.”
The events unfolding in Ukraine confirm this method of using these weapons in conflicts. And it has long been used against Belarus. All these threats are reflected in the new draft of our National Security Concept. It should be noted that the use of information-psychological weapons is characterised by numerous specific details and nuances, which requires the training of highly qualified specialists capable of organising opposition to it. In our case, the organisation of counteraction to such weapons is helped by the practical experience gained in 2020, when the active phase of the use of such weapons began against Belarus. With this experience, it is easier to develop effective strategies that can repel such attacks.

By Svetlana Isaenok