Some declassified documents on the events of December 19
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The masterminded scenario of the events which led to the attack of the Government Residence was initially based on the extensive financing, primarily intended for the activities of the civil campaign “Tell the Truth”.
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From an operative summary
“On the eve of the elections day V.Nekliaev discussed the forthcoming unauthorised protest demonstration with the ambassadors of Poland, Germany and Sweden. On the eve of the elections day V.Nekliaev also had meetings with E.Buzek (Chairman of the European Parliament), R.Sikorski (Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland), V.Klaus (President of the Czech Republic), G.Westerwelle (Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany). The questions of assistance and personal support of the candidate were discussed during the meetings.
In Russia V.Nekliaev had a meeting with a representative of the Administration of the Russian Federation and, together with A.Sannikov suggested to him an alternative economic blockade against the Republic of Belarus, by declaring that Belarusian goods are dangerous for health. The purpose was to make Belarus lose the Russian market and face economic problems.
On September 1 and 2, 2010, the leaders of the “Tell the Truth” V.Nekliaev and A.Feduta visited Moscow to establish contacts with the officials of the Administration of the President of the RF in order to get financial and methodological assistance to the “Tell the Truth” campaign and to its leader in his nomination as a candidate for the Belarusian presidency. It was A.Feduta who arranged the visit.
V.Nekliaev and A.Feduta had a meeting with the head of the International Financial Centre of Russia A.Voloshin who chaired the Administration of the President of the RF from 1999 till 2003.The issue discussed was the provision of possible finances for TT CC on the part of large businesses which were interested in purchasing large industrial enterprises and promising plots for construction at the lowest price possible.
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The main items of expense of the “Tell the Truth”
civil campaign:
1. Running the office: salaries, office premises rent, office equipment, security service.
2. Information campaign, internet campaign, cost of development and placement in the mass media, rent of servers, development and support of the website and other information resources, purchase of newspaper during the electoral campaign.
3. Volunteers’ work: collection of voters’ signatures, canvasses, pickets, dissemination of printed materials.
4. Contingency costs: cell phone payments, travelling expenses, food and accommodation during business trips, other expenses connected with the campaign.
5. Training of teams.
6. Legal service and prompt legal assistance.
7. Sociological service.
8. Organisation of control over the voting.
9. Mobilisation to protect the results of the elections.
Calculation of the total cost of the campaign salaries can be made at 3 USD per voter. If necessary to work with 5 mln.voters, the formula would be as follows:
3 USD*5 mln. = 15 mln. + 10% of the budget are allocated for contingency expenses and a change of plans = 16, 5 mln. USD.
This sum included the cost of mobilisation to the square.
Approximate cost of the “ploshcha” was calculated according to the scheme:
Food — 50,000 people*10 USD = 500,000 USD per day.
It was assumed that the number of people at the square would be constantly growing; 50,000 people— is the largest number of people who are present at the square at the same time.
The inventory necessary for simultaneous presence of 15,000 people at the square is purchased in advance (4 months prior to the elections, minimum) and is estimated at 30 USD per person = 450,000 USD.
The cost of storage and delivery — 100,000 USD.
From an analytical note
Regarding the source of the money, members of the TT CC Directorate assumed that it was the money of official European institutions (“from Brussels”). In their opinion, no other source is able to provide that much money alone. Neither Poland nor Germany, nor any other country is able to provide this sum of money single-handedly.
Importantly, Germany plays the leading part. Among other “sponsors” there were representatives of a “governmental institution” of the Republic of Poland.
S.Vozniak, a campaign coordinator, used the students of the European Humanities University (Vilnius), with whom he was on friendly terms, as couriers in one of the main money delivery channels.
The couriers crossed the border on foot, which reduced the risk of personal check. It was planned that the money would not be stored in Belarus, but would be distributed among the stakeholders (members of the Directorate).
In some cases the amounts of 150,000 — 200,000 USD were transported at a time. After delivery within the shortest periods the finances were distributed among all TT CC members.
Bank safe deposits were reserved in Lithuania, Poland, Estonia and Latvia where the donor deposited the money for couriers.
INSTRUCTION FOR THE TT CC FUNCTIONARIES ON THE DELIVERY, STORAGE AND LEGALISATION OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES IN BELARUS
Under the project there are four stages of working with funds:
1. Delivery of money to Belarus
There are several options of money delivery to Belarus, each having its advantages and disadvantages. No variant can be the only one available; the optimal choice is the combination of several variants depending on the situation. The main one is the “Courier” option.
Cashless payment — this method is suitable for a sociological service and, partially, for a media service.
How it works: the money is transferred within the EU (Warsaw, Vilnius, Riga, Tallinn) to the head of a sociological service. The latter transfers the money to a company in that country and that company places an official order with the Belarusian laboratory and pays for it from the account. Media service can also be partially paid up according to this scheme.
Cost: tax revenue 15%, bank fee up to 3%, VAT 18% + the percent for the money— transferring company.
Pluses:
a) legalisation of the Belarusian laboratory and media company activities;
b) legalisation of money.
Minuses:
limited amount of money to transfer (up to 60, 000 USD per year).
“Master Card” — certain banks allow opening accounts including those not confirmed by IDs. That gives an opportunity to have different accounts for different people both connected and not connected with the project. An important aspect is that the bank card is not registered when withdrawing money from an ATM, it is only registered in case of payment for services with the bank card.
How it works: the money is brought to a certain city or is taken from the bank cell (see the “Safe” option) and is deposited to bank accounts in order to withdraw it via ATMs afterwards.
The amount one can deposit at a time is 25,000 USD, periodicity is approximately once a month. This method is used by businessmen.
Cost: bank fee 3%, withdrawal fee — up to 2%.
Pluses:
a) no need to cross the border and legalisation of money in the country;
b) opportunity to withdraw money in the country;
c) money management by anybody who withdraws money;
d) this method is not suspicious for anybody including bank officers, as everybody thinks that this is money of the business but not policy, which is common practice for the bank.
Minuses:
a) limited amount of money for a single withdrawal;
b) limitation for a single withdrawal from an ATM — 1,000 Euro per day.
“Partner” registration of non-governmental organisations is very simple in the countries adjacent to Belarus. NGOs may operate for donations of their members and third parties and act as sponsors themselves. The money received in Belarus as donations can be taxed up to 15 percent and then used at the beneficiary’s sole discretion.
How it works: an organisation is registered, and some amount of money is deposited to its account. This organisation donates money to the “Tell the Truth” institution, and the institution pays for the office and daily operational expenses with the money, as well as employs its staff. It is important that only foreign citizens should be founders of this organisation (the acquaintances and friends of the Directorate, except for the citizens of the Republic of Poland). There may be several organisations like that, and they can be incorporated one after another. Each organisation cannot be used for more than three to four months. The amount of money may vary and must be additionally agreed upon with lawyers.
Cost: registration of an organisation, 5 to 7 percent for transfer, the bank fee.
Pluses:
activities and expenses of the central office are legalised.
Minuses:
a) limited nature of resources as this method can only be applied to operations of the central office;
b) during the campaign, it will be required to register and dissolve the organisation;
c) a certain period of time is required to register partner organisations.
The “Courier” will be the major method for the campaign. This variant is the most widespread and the most efficient, in spite of the highest degree of risk. It is based on the knowledge of psychology of frontier authorities and appropriate behavior. One may bring up to 10,000 USD to Belarus without declaring the money.
Courier employment. Each Directorate member selects his own team of couriers who follow the general rules and deliver the money in accordance with the schedule of the Directorate member. It is desirable to employ couriers via a third party. A courier is a person not associated with the campaign, politics, and public life in Belarus. In other words, an “average citizen”.
The best options for couriers are: 1) Elderly people 2) A family with a small child 3) A student 4) A handicapped person. Couriers never know each other.
The courier is unaware of the true purpose of the money, he or she only knows the legend. According to the legend, the money is delivered to Belarus as undeclared cash profit of a business entity. The courier is also briefed on the rules of behavior and information is given in accordance with the Instruction.
Money delivery. The courier arrives in the country to get the money and receives an amount for transportation. The money is not given in the city of money storage but in a different city or place. The trip back to Belarus across the border should take place at night, which causes psychological difficulties in conducting additional search by frontier authorities.
The courier should not have many belongings, and they should all be arranged in direct view of the frontier authorities, which creates the impression of “trust and transparency”. Everything must be in sight of border guards, ready for inspection. The money is in a special belt on the body of a courier, so you can detect it only through personal inspection. Personal inspection is performed only on direct orders from the central authority concerning the people on a special list.
With respect to an ordinary citizen, personal inspection is almost never used because of the complexity of the procedure (you need to detain vehicles, to make a detailed protocol, indicate the reason for inspection). The courier has only one number (Lithuanian, etc.), to which he should send an SMS in case of failure. It is desirable to employ an “observer” along with the Courier, who is not knowledgeable about the existence of the latter.
The “observer” does not know about the project and the details associated with the courier. The task of the “observer” is to be next to the courier, to monitor the possible surveillance, to report in case of emergency to a Lithuanian phone number. So, a ticket is booked for the “observer” in the same compartment or on the same coach next to the courier. The COURIER IS NOT FAMILIAR with the “observer”. One carrier can be used four times, not more than once or twice a month. The courier does not know their trip schedule and receives information on each trip separately, having no idea whether he would be contacted again.
Visa support by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is required for couriers when implementing this option: a Directorate member comes to the Embassy of the Republic of Poland with a list of people that “participate in a number of workshops held in the RP at different times, for instance, “RP Democratic Institutions”, he submits the list with passports and filled out forms, and then comes and picks up the passports. A 6-month multi-Schengen visa is required. The approximate periodicity of these applications is once in two months, and once a month starting from the 5th month prior to the elections. In certain cases, organised groups can act as couriers.
For instance, from December 10 till December 13, 2009, a workshop organised by the campaign Directorate member will be held in Vilnius. The workshop includes 28 Belarusians, who can be couriers and take the amount of 9,000 USD (for example, up to the allowed amount of 10,000 USD) each from Lithuania to Belarus. Thus, if the money is delivered to Vilnius until December, 12, the group will be able to transport 252,000 USD to Belarus thinking that this is the money for the project they participate in.
Members of the campaign Directorate and members of their families can act as couriers until the end of 2009.
Cost: courier’s travel expenses up to 60 USD, meals for one day — 30 USD, payment for the service up to 2 percent of the amount transferred, SIM-card of a Lithuanian operator, a cheap cell phone.
Pluses:
The opportunity to transport large amounts of cash (up to 200,000 USD per trip).
Minuses:
Risk of disclosing the courier and loss of money.
2. Legalisation of money in Belarus
Legalisation of the main amount of money is implemented via distributing the rumors that the “Tell the Truth” campaign is a project sponsored by Brussels via a German partner. This is convincing, as everybody knows that there is money in Brussels but nobody knows how to get it, so there would be little doubt that somebody had managed to do so. The German partner witnesses that the campaign can not be opposed to the authority in Belarus. The rumor is “secretly” spread when employing services and communicating with third parties.
A part of the money will be legalised when implementing the delivery options “Master Card”, “Cashless Payment”, and “Partner”. The money will also be partially legalised via official loans and declaring it with a tax authority and also through fictitious contracts with companies for performance of work.
The legalised sum of money for each member of the Directorate and each candidate should be no less than $10,000.
3. Keeping the money
When keeping the money, the same system is applied as with the delivery. Horizontal ties between people are stronger and more secure than the institutional ones. So renting safety deposit boxes in Belarusian banks is not an option.
‘Safe’ — the laws of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia allow foreigners to rent safety deposit boxes in banks. The principle of bank secrecy is applied to this information and it is not subject to disclosure. It is important that several people can have access to one safety deposit box.
How this works:
Stage 1. Renting a safety deposit box
Each of the Directorate members rents safety deposit boxes in Riga, Vilnius, and Tallinn together with a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, giving him a right of exclusive access to the safety deposit box.
IMPORTANT: Thus, each member of the Directorate has two or three boxes in the Baltic States, which are filled in accordance with the general application for financing, and the money is withdrawn when needed by every Directorate member. When a member of the Directorate rents a safety deposit box, it is preferable that someone else from the Directorate should have access to the box in case of emergency.
Stage 2. Filling the safety deposit boxes
A representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland brings the necessary amount of money to Vilnius, Riga, Tallinn and fills the safety deposit box of each member of the Directorate with the amount previously specified in the claim for financing.
Stage 3. Withdrawing money from a safety deposit box
A member of the Directorate comes to the city where the money is left and takes the necessary amount from the box. After that one of the plans to deliver the money to Belarus comes into effect (see above).
Cost: a) renting safety deposit boxes in a bank for a year, b) travel expenses and accommodation for the members of the Directorate, c) travel expenses and accommodation for the representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland.
‘Friend’ — As previously stated, the most effective method in Belarus (taking into account the specific nature of the country) is to give the money to trusted people for keeping.
How this works: when the money arrives in Belarus, it is divided into five or more parts and is given for safekeeping to friends or, even better, to their close relatives. It is allowed to call the ‘Friend’ about the money only one time and to take the whole sum of money at once. Before that a special language used when saying that the money is needed, is discussed. It should not cause suspicions if the communication equipment is bugged. For example, УLetТs have a nice hearty dinner today somewhere away from the city centreФ. When we use a СFriendТ on several occasions, the phrase is changed each time.
Expenses: a bottle of cognac and a chocolate bar, a Schengen visa issued for a year.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR EMPLOYERS ON BRIEFING A COURIER AND HANDLING THE MONEY IN BELARUS
(should be given orally or, even better, in writing and the document should be later destroyed).
The money that the courier is carrying belongs to a business and is its undeclarable cash profit;
the information about the exact amount of money is not given to the courier;
the courier is told when and where he is to meet the employer (THE COURIER DOES NOT KNOW HOW AND WHEN THE EMPLOYER IS GOING TO GET TO THE MEETING POINT);
the courier must cross the border without a mobile phone;
it is forbidden to inform third parties about the trip;
when the courier is in the country where he receives the money, he is forbidden from using the Internet and other means of communication and from informing third parties of his whereabouts;
below is a list of things a courier can take: a small bag, a book, a pen, a notebook, personal belongings.
When the courier and the employer meet in a specified location:
Option No. 1
The money, which is preferably packed in a ‘belt’, is given to the courier. The way the courier placed it is checked (THE COURIER MUST NOT KNOW WHERE AND HOW THE MONEY WILL BE TAKEN FROM HIM);
The courier is given a mobile phone with one number stored in its memory. The number is provided by a foreign phone service. He is warned that he is not allowed to make any calls or send any text messages except for those indicated below. He is warned that his phone is traced and that by breaking this rule he loses his pay;
he is given a ticket for his trip back (BEFORE THAT THE COURIER DOES NOT KNOW HOW HE IS GOING TO TRAVEL BACK);
a meals pay;
the courier is briefed on what he has to do after crossing the border.
Option No. 2
The courier is given a mobile phone with one number stored in its memory. The number is provided by a foreign phone service. He is warned that he is not allowed to make any calls or send any text messages except for those indicated below. He is warned that his phone is traced and that by breaking this rule he loses his pay. In the phone’s memory there is also the number of the luggage locker at a railway station where the money is kept, preferably packed in a ‘belt’, and the code. In the locker there is also a ticket for his trip back (BEFORE THAT THE COURIER DOES NOT KNOW HOW HE IS GOING TO TRAVEL BACK);
a meals pay;
the courier is briefed on what he has to do after crossing the border.
If the courier crosses the border successfully:
he sends a text message to the number stored in the phone’s memory, saying that everything is fine; he gets further instructions in reply. In any case he checks his luggage for foreign objects (a GPS navigation device): if he locates an accidental object, he should take it out of his bag and put it in any other inconspicuous place in the vehicle, with no people noticing it.
If the operation fails:
the courier should switch off his phone;
when asked whose money this is, he should say that a Lithuanian man he met in a restaurant (the Lithuanian sat down at his table) asked him to carry the money and that he had to leave it in an automatic luggage locker at a station. He was paid to carry the money.
Instructions given if the courier has crossed the border successfully: the courier is told where he has to get off, he is met and given a password (which is chosen at the discretion of the employer); the courier hands over the money and the mobile phone; after the meeting the courier returns to the vehicle and resumes his trip; the courier does not know when he will be contacted next; the mobile phone is switched off, the battery is taken out, the SIM card is thrown away.
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From an analytical note
The work of the “Tell the Truth” Directorate is coordinated from abroad by the so-called ‘minor office’. Its decisions are communicated to the Directorate through A. Feduta, who knows all the members of the office personally. One of the members of the ‘minor office’, a German, who calls himself Rafael M., regularly meets the members of the Directorate in the countries bordering Belarus. Meetings are called by A. Feduta and Skype is used for emergency contacts between the members of the Directorate and Rafael M.
Below there is a fragment of secret correspondence between Rafael M. and the “Tell the Truth” Directorate, “We have an offer. We can help you to organise a number of meetings with people who will help you. Prepare a letter about that.
We will try to get you in contact with the Head and also with some influential people in the Parliament. It is very important ‘cause these people have the resources you are going to need after December 19. Once you’ve established the contacts you will be able to organise those resources. Now the names: Wojciech Paczynski (CASE), Jerzy Kozminski (Polish-American Freedom Foundation), Agnieszka Komarowska (Stefan Batory Foundation), Jan Malinski (Warsaw University of Eastern Europe). I’ve sent this to Sasha (Feduta) as well. Write a message and try to mail it at the beginning of the week. Those people will help you with the PR campaign.”
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From an analytical note
The leader of the Young Front D. Dashkevich received USD 70, 000 from Statkevich to organise “fighting squads” that were to take part in the action at the square. Together with A. Palazhenko, D. Dashkevich appropriated part of these funds as well as funds received earlier from a foreign non-commercial organisation. He used the money to buy a Chrysler, which was registered as belonging of A. Palazhenko so as not to discredit D. Dashkevich.
On the very eve of the elections the head of the Right Alliance organisation Yuri Karetnikov made several visits to various regions of the country to meet with local representatives. His primary goal was to mobilise as many activists from radical structures as possible for the mass protests in Minsk on December 19, 2010.
Karetnikov received 15, 000 USD to support the actions of the fighting squad at the square. Also, members of the Right Alliance were promised 50 USD for every 4 hours of their participation in the mass protests on December 19 and the following actions. If detained, dismissed from job or expelled from university, the activists were to receive financial aid and assistance in getting a new job or entering a university.
It was supposed that on December 19, 2010 at Oktyabrskaya Square the candidates would set up a Decision-Making Committee to coordinate the protest action. Specific steps of the protesters were to be dependent upon the number of people gathered at Oktyabrskaya Square. In case the crowd was large enough “they had to be led to some other place.” Accordingly, several variants of the march were considered: to the President’s Administration, Belarusian TV and Radio Company or some other state-run media company, or to important governmental institutions.
As he talked to the activists of the BCD and Young Front on the eve of the protest action, P. Severinets insisted on their bringing crowbars to the square to “pick out the paving tiles and throw them at the riot police (OMON).” He also strongly maintained the necessity of staging direct clashes with the law enforcement officers, seizing government buildings, etc: “in short, the point is to be active and after the action Minsk should look like it did in 1943…” And this person dares to state himself to “adhere to Christian values.”
Activist of the “Tell the Truth” campaign A.Yanushev spent 4, 000 USD to procure equipment necessary for the campaign’s “squad”.
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From an analytical note:
“Traditionally, the plans of the West rely heavily on the activities of special services. As regards the current election campaign, it is necessary to point out that there are documents confirming numerous instances of our country being visited by foreign intelligence officers and their agents. For example, on his stay in Belarus N — an agent from a Western European country — actively collected materials on the “undemocratic nature” of the elections, was present at the scenes of unauthorised mass actions, observed the actions of the law enforcement bodies and transmitted the information he received back to his country in real time.
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From the materials of the State Frontier Committee
“On December 15 a group of 5 people, residents from the town of Rovno, was detected at the Mokrany checkpoint at the Belarus-Ukraine border. They tried to enter Belarus by car as if with the aim of taking part in a “training workshop”. Then it turned out there was no any workshops of that kind. They had warm clothes, tents, sleeping bags, photo and video equipment. The addresses of their destination points in Belarus turned out to be fake. They also had insignificant amounts of cash on them — no more than 50 USD — and were going to stay in Belarus till December 21, 2010.
Later, a similar group of 4 residents of Ivano-Frankovsk region was denied entry. They all came from the same village and claimed they did not know each other. When questioned, they could not clearly state the aim of their visit and were also going to stay in the country till December 20. Apart from warm clothes they had similar sets of knives, 30 in total.
Typically, these groups carried out multiple attempts of entering Belarus later at other checkpoints and on different dates, showing some persistence.
The Belarus-Poland border. Two young people were denied entry. They had flags, tents, warm clothes and were clearly going to be at the “ploshcha”.
…At the beginning of November operational agencies of the frontier service received intelligence information on a group of demolition experts from Asian countries (outside the CIS) that planned to enter Belarus and to organise a number of terror attacks on the elections day. The group intended to act with the assistance of the ethnic community in Minsk by secretly engaging its potential.
On December 19 the frontier services on the Belarus-Lithuania border detained a courier (Igor Vladislavovich Semeniako, born in 1986) carrying about 7 thousand doses. The drugs were to be delivered to Minsk on the same day and distributed among the participants of the protest actions.
A group of 7 people was detected at the Mokhro checkpoint on December 13, 2010 trying to transport a smoke flare, an electric shocker, 5 rubber truncheons and one slingshot to Belarus. It was established that the above-mentioned individuals had taken an active part in street actions during the so-called “orange revolution” in Ukraine; on the eve of the 2006 Presidential elections in Belarus they received special training in using force to counteract actions of law enforcement officers, provided by activists of the Zubr movement.
On December 16, 2010 two citizens of Poland (born in 1986 and 1988, respectively) were detained on a train crossing the “Brest-Tsentralny” checkpoint. They carried 2 boxes of traumatic rounds for smoothbore weapon (5 rounds per box), an electric shocker and side arms. When asked, the abovementioned individuals were unable to provide a clear answer as to the aim of their visit to Belarus, referred to non-existing addresses in Minsk. It was later established that they were active participants of the anti-globalist movement, took part in protest actions and clashes with the police in West European countries.
On December 17, 2010 Belarusian frontier services denied entry to a Russian mini-van with 12 activists of the radical organisation Oborona (Defence). It was found that the passengers of the vehicle were carrying 2 telescopic metal rods and brass knuckles, a number of weapon-like items made of metal, 6 tents and 14 sleeping bags as well as an official uniform of an officer of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Belarus”.
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From an analytical note
“From all the candidates for presidency N.Statkevich took the most aggressive position. Under the preliminary arrangement with the “BelSat” TV channel (Poland) he provocatively announced the previously fabricated results of the exit-polls (the President in Office supposedly won only 31 % of votes) and called all those who gathered “to go to A.Lukashenko and ask him to vacate the residence and concede the power”.
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From an analytical note
“We should turn a special attention to the participation of foreign representatives in the “ploshcha” action, because thanks to the actions of special services every minute of the chronology of events is restored.
It is necessary to notice that possessing the information that separate destructive forces planned some provocative actions, everything possible was done to persuade the foreign diplomats to refrain from participating in the meeting of opponents to the authorities as it could be regarded by their participants as an expression of direct support of their actions.
On December 16, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus was informed about the undesirability of participation of diplomats in the unauthorised action according to the legislation. Law enforcement bodies noted that the most radical representatives discussed the questions of the possible organisation of actions which could be carried out during the unauthorised “ploshcha” action and which could be aimed at the aggravation of the situation and provocation of clashes with the law enforcement bodies by use of pyrotechnic devices. Among those who organised these forceful actions there is one of the candidates for the presidency of Belarus and his registered agents. It is thus planned to present the demonstrators’ actions as the result of provocation of special services during “the peaceful” action and to use the occured panic as to achieve their purposes”.
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From an operative note
“During the telephone conversation of the employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus Malinovsky with the German ambassador K.Weil, Malinovsky brought the information about N.Statkevich’s provocative actions who planned to lead the crowd to the President’s Administration building. In view of the possible contacts of Statkevich’s party with the German colleagues, Malinovsky addressed the ambassador with the request to influence the Belarusian oppositionist. Weil noted that “appeals can remain peaceful” and then he indicated that “he won’t interfere in this situation”.
“Despite the warning of possible pogroms and mass riots, employees of the embassies of the UK, Sweden, Latvia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria planned “to carry out supervision” of the action in the Oktyabrskaya Square on December 19.
Moreover, at the given stage some diplomats represented themselves as “lawyers” of organisers and potential participants of the unauthorised action. It is necessary to specially note that taking into account the vigorous activity of the ambassador of Sweden to Minsk S.Eriksson on his developing the closest relations with the individual persons bearing extremist intentions, he and some his colleague-diplomats should provide “the international” backing to “the Government of National Rescue” and help justify pogroms and provocations.
The participation of diplomats in the unauthorised action was perceived by the crowd as support of their actions and urged those especially zealous to take the most resolute actions”.
***
From an operative note.
The chronicle
At 22.05 A.Sannikov called on the protesters to go to the Government Residence and “negotiate with the authorities” and then the crowd moved forward to the central entrance of the building. At 22.21 the protesters managed to open one door and began to get inside, with A.Sannikov crying out, “They have just opened the Government door to us, we have been waiting for it for 16 years. Here there are a lot of journalists, our friends, let us come together, we are making history”.
At 22.30 the law-enforcement bodies started the operation on suppression of the illegal action by separating the crowd and isolating the most active group.
At 22.50 G.Kostusev called on the young people «to hold the fort up to the end».
Part of the protesters tried to get into the Government Residence through the broken door.
The forces of special divisions of law-enforcement bodies carried out “the cleanup operation” of Independence Square from 23.05 to 23.30.
The participants of the demonstration were disseminated. The largest group of 500 people moved towards Oktyabrskaya Square, however it was blocked and separated.
During the dissemination of the crowd part of young people tried to get rid of the means of street fight (armature, iron rods, and other subjects for mutilation), throwing them out in the place of the action as they were going away”.
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From operative materials (December 19, 23.20)
A.Lebedko calls the head of Vilnius representative office of the International Republican Institute (IRI, USA).
Lebedko, “Statkevich did it. He declared expressly, “Now we’ll go into the building”. And so they did. They approached it and it was clear that all the doors there were closed”.
***
From operative materials
Fragment of the telephone conversation between D.Sadovsky, co-chairman of the BCD, an active worker of the staff of the ex-candidate V.Rymashevsky, and the Gomel BCD supporter K.Zhukovsky (12/20/2010 — 1:03:40 AM).
S: Speaking.
Zh: How are you there? Is everything OK with you?
S: There’s nothing OK here. It is just terrible...
Zh: Just tell me one thing. Who’s breaking the doors? Were they provokers, right?
S: No, Kastus, unfortunately, they were not provokers.
Zh: And if we had not broken the doors and would just put up tents, everything would be different, right? Or they would chase them anyway?
S: I don’t know. I think that would be different.
***
From operative materials
“On December 20 in his conversation with A.Milinkevich S.Kaliakin said, “We should emphasise that this action was planned by the authorities. We need to think how to win it back politically. It is necessary to write it off to the authorities. Writing it off to ourselves is simply idiocy”. As he said, “those who are in prison should assert that it is provocation of the authorities. It is important to do so for the West. It is necessary to pick up photos, hold a press conference and require investigations”.
They stormed the Government Residence
The list of active participants of unauthorised protest action on 19.12.2010
(falling within article 293 (“Organisation of Mass Riots”) and 339 (“Hooliganism”) of the Criminal Code)
1. Vinogradov Pavel Yurievich, born 1988, registered at the address: Minsk, Gazety “Zvyazda” Avenue... Activist of the “European Belarus” movement, one of the coordinators of the “Tell the Truth” civil campaign of Frunzensky District. As a “Jeans” movement activist in 2008 he participated in the activity of the so-called “striking force” of the youth radical politised groupings which held street protest actions in an aggressive way with the open disobedience to law enforcement bodies. Regularly participates in street rallies.
Participated in the pogroms, attempted to seize an administrative building — the Government Residence, using household items (a hammer), broke windows, attacked law enforcement officers, incited the crowd to act.
2. Gnedchik Oleg Andreevich, born 1986, registered at the address: Minsk, Panchenko St.... One of the coordinators of the TT CC in Frunzensky District of Minsk. An activist of the Young Front. Regularly participates in street rallies. In May 2006, participated in workshops and combat training sessions in a forest-based camp in western Ukraine, organised by the Ukrainian nationalist association “Youth National Congress”. In 2006, he was sentenced to 1 year of correctional works under Article 205 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Belarus.
Participated in the pogroms, attempted to seize an administrative building — the Government Residence, broke windows, attacked law enforcement officers, incited the crowd to act.
3. Likhovid Nikita Yurievich, born 1990, registered at the address: Minsk, Shugaeva St.... An activist of the movement “For Freedom”. Participated in a workshop on the topic of “Leadership — the Impact of Youth” in Birstonas (Lithuania) organised with support of the Swedish Foundation “SILCA”. Was penalised under the administrative law.
Participated in the pogroms, attempted to seize an administrative building — the Government Residence, broke windows, attacked law enforcement officers using household items (sticks, rods), incited the crowd to act.
4. Parfenkov Vasily Petrovich, born 1983, registered at the address: Minsk, Tikotskogo St.... A supporter of the TT CC. From 2001 till 2005, he was a member of “Zubr” and the Young Front. From October 2004 till January 2005, he participated in the election campaign of the Ukrainian presidential candidate Viktor Yushchenko (the collection of signatures, protests, including the Maidan) in Kiev. Participated in capturing Yanukovich’s Office together with UNA UNSO members with whom he is on friendly terms.
Participated in the pogroms, attempted to seize an administrative building — the Government Residence, broke windows, attacked law enforcement officers using household items, incited the crowd to act.
5. Fedorkevich Oleg Vladimirovich, born 1961, registered at the address: Minsk, Puteiskiy Lane... A former member of the BPF.
While being in the state of alcohol abuse, he participated in the pogroms, was one of the most active rioters. Attempted to seize an administrative building — the Government Residence, broke windows, attacked law enforcement officers, posed before the cameras, incited the crowd to act, shouted threats to the authorities.
6. Khomichenko Vladimir Nikolaevich, born 1986, registered at the address: Slutsk, Urochishche Puporova St.... Politically unaffiliated.
While being in the state of alcohol abuse, he participated in the pogroms, was one of the most active rioters. Attempted to seize an administrative building — the Government Residence, broke windows, doors, using household items (sticks, rods), attacked law enforcement officers, posed before the cameras, incited the crowd to act, shouted threats to the authorities.
7. Apishev Dmitry Alexandrovich, born 1973, registered at the address: Minsk, Yanki Mavra St... An activist of the TT CC. Actively participated in the events at Independence Square.
8. Novik Dmitry Leonidovich, born 1981, a security guard at the UAE Embassy, Minsk. An activist of the “European Belarus”.
Participated in the pogroms, attempted to seize an administrative building — the Government Residence, broke windows, doors.
9. Kviatkevich Alexander Alexandrovich , born 1987, registered at the address: Minsk, Voronianskogo St.... An activist of the TT CC.
He was in the front rows of those participating in the pogroms. Attempted to seize an administrative building — the Government Residence, broke glass, doors.
10. Klaskovski Alexander Alexandrovich, born 1978, Rokossovskogo St... A former employee of Leninsky District Department of Internal Affairs.
While being in the state of alcohol abuse, he participated in the pogroms, attempted to seize an administrative building — the Government Residence, broke windows, doors.
11. Loban Vladimir Vladimirovich, born 1988, Verkhnedvinsk, Pervomaiskaya St, a worker at GSRIK Ltd. An active participant in the “European Belarus”.
Attempted to seize an administrative building — the Government Residence, broke windows, doors. Attacked law enforcement officers, incited the crowd to act. Attempted to get hold of police special gear to use in the riot.
12. Novitsky Leonid Alexandrovich, born 1973, registered at the address: Borisov, Normandy-Neman St... a “Jeans” member.
Resisted the police.
13. Vasilevich Ilya Leonidovich, born 1991, registered at the address: Baranovichi, Domashevichskaya St...
Attempted to seize an administrative building — the Government Residence, broke windows, doors. Attacked law enforcement officers, incited the crowd to act.
14. Vasilevsky Alexander Vladimirovich, born 1985, registered at the address: Minsk, Logoiski Avenue...
Actively participated in the pogroms, attempted to seize an administrative building — the Government Residence, broke windows, doors, attacked law enforcement officers using household items.
15. Breus Artiom Yurievich, born 1983, Minsk, Dolgobrodskaya St... Unemployed, a Russian citizen, an Estonian residence permit.
Actively particpated in clashes with the police.
16. Gaponov Ivan Igorevich, born in 1988, Pukhovichi District, the town of Svisloch, Stroitelei St... Unemployed, a Russian citizen, a Belarusian residence permit. A “Jeans” activist.
Actively participated in clashes with the riot police (OMON).
17. Medved Dmitri Leonidovich, born 1990, Minsk, Karbysheva St...
Actively participated in clashes with the riot police (OMON).
18. Pozniak Andrei Alexandrovich, born 1977, Zhodino, Gagarina St... A member of the Young Front.
Punched and kicked law enforcement officers.
19. Kovalenko Vsevolod Gennadievich, born 1961. Registered at the address: Minsk, Cherviakova St... Unemployed.
Actively participated in clashes with the riot police (OMON).
20. Beliaev Alexander Leonidovich , born 1982, Minsk District, the village of Koraleshchevichi, Kommunisticheskaya St.... CJSC Beltelekabel, a press operator.
Actively participated in clashes with the riot police (OMON).
The police are now working to establish the identity of other people engaged in the pogroms.
